Understanding the Local Bias in Procurement Evidence from National and Subnational governments

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Introduction Big picture motivation

- · Governments are big producers of final goods and services
 - \circ Output = G ≈ 20-40% GDP
- · They buy intermediate inputs from private firms
 - \circ Public procurement \approx 10-20% GDP
 - Q1: What factors determine government choices of inputs?
 - Q2: How do these choices affect governments' efficiency as final producers?

- Q1: What factors determine government choices of inputs?
- $\, \hookrightarrow \,$ Home bias is an important factor
- Q2: How do these choices affect governments' productivity as final producers?
- $\, \hookrightarrow \,$ Home bias makes governments significantly less productive

Introduction

High geographical concentration of government purchases

• Government purchases are highly geographically concentrated in the EU

- Regionally: > 50% awarded to local establishments
- Nationally: > 98% awarded to national establishments

Two potential explanations

- 1. Bilateral frictions to procure goods and services
 - Ex: transport costs, information frictions, path dependence, etc.

2. Governments' home bias

- Ex: "Buy American Act" in US, "Buy Ontario" (BOBI) act in Canada

- This phenomenon is particularly intriguing in the case of Europe
 - · Public procurement market supposedly perfectly integrated
 - · However, improving access to procurement markets central in EC's agenda


 \circ "Increases government chances of getting better value for money and makes the use of public resources more efficient"

Introduction

The role of governments in explaining the lack of market integration

- Two strategies to identify governments' home bias
 - 1. Exploit co-existence of different government agencies in the same location
 - Hypothesis: "Home" has a different meaning for different government types
 - o Subnational governments discriminate against establishments from other regions
 - National governments discriminate against establishments from other countries
 - 2. Natural experiment in France
 - Consolidation of regions in 2016: from 21 to 13

⇒ Key in the two strategies: control for origin-destination level confounding factors




Subnat non-local purchases



García-Santana, Santamaría

Subnat local purchases Understanding the Local Bias in Procurement



García-Santana, Santamaría


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Introduction Strategy # 2



Notes: This figure shows the French distribution of regions before and after the integration 2016 integration reform. Regions in blue refer to regions that were affected by the integration process. Thin lines in grey represent the regional borders before the reform. Thick lines in black represent the regional borders after the reform.

Local expenditure shares in France and Spain



A naive look at the data A simple decomposition

• Local share: Share of expenditure in region r on establishments from r

$$\lambda_{rr} = \frac{X_{rr}}{X_r} = \frac{X_{rr}^{nat} + X_{rr}^{sub}}{X_r^{nat} + X_r^{sub}}$$

• Simple manipulations allow to decompose it into 4 different components

$$\underbrace{\lambda_{rr}}_{\lambda_{rr}} = \underbrace{\left(\frac{X_r^{nat}}{X_r^{nat} + X_r^{sub}}\right)}_{\text{local sh nat.}(\lambda_{rr}^{nat})} \underbrace{\left(\frac{X_{rr}^{nat}}{X_r^{nat}}\right)}_{\text{local sh nat.}(\lambda_{rr}^{nat})} + \underbrace{\left(\frac{X_r^{sub}}{X_r^{sub} + X_r^{sub}}\right)}_{\text{local sh sub-nat.}(\lambda_{rr}^{sub})} \underbrace{\left(\frac{X_{rr}^{sub}}{X_r^{sub}}\right)}_{\text{local sh sub-nat.}(\lambda_{rr}^{sub})}$$

• Naive counterfactual: set $\lambda_{rr}^{sub} = \lambda_{rr}^{nat}$ and re-compute λ_{rr}

– Aggregate local share would decrease to
$$\hat{\lambda}_{rr}$$
 = 0.29 ($\downarrow 45\%$)
by sector

Strategy # 1 Regressions

Intensive margin

• sales by establishment j (in o) of product k to government type g in region d

$$\log X_{j,od}^{k,g} = \beta \times \mathbb{1} \underbrace{(o \neq d)}_{\text{non-local}} \times \mathbb{1} \underbrace{(g = s)}_{\text{sub. gov.}} + \operatorname{FE}_{j} + \operatorname{FE}_{d}^{g} + \operatorname{FE}_{od}^{k,g} + \operatorname{FE}_{od} + \epsilon_{j,od}^{k,g}$$

Extensive margin

• share of establishments located in o that sell product k in d to govt type g

$$\mathbf{S}_{od}^{k,g} = exp\left[\gamma \times \mathbb{1} \underbrace{(o \neq d)}_{\text{non-local}} \times \mathbb{1} \underbrace{(g = s)}_{\text{sub. gov.}} + \mathbf{FE}_d^g + \mathbf{FE}_{od} + \mathbf{FE}^{gk} \right] u_{od}^{k,g}$$

Strategy # 1 *Regressions: Baseline results*

	Intensive margin	Extensive margin
Dependent variable:	$\log(\log X_{j,od}^{k,g})$	$\mathbf{S}_{od}^{k,g}$
	(1)	(2)
non-local= $1 \times sub.gov=1$	-0.259*** (0.053)	-0.582 ^{***} (0.067)
Establishment FE	Yes	N/A
Origin × Dest. FE Gov type × Dest. FE	Yes Yes	Yes Yes
Gov type x Sector FE	Yes	Yes
Observations R-squared	105,724 0.563	156,924 0.431
Estimator	OLS	PPML

Table: Estimating Governments' Home bias

- IM: Non-local estab. (relative to local) sell $\approx 23\%$ less to subnational than to national
- EM: Non-local estab. (relative to local) participate $\approx 44\%$ less in subnational than in national

Strategy # 1: Our reduced form estimates through a simple model *A multi-region version of Melitz*

- Use a simple trade model to interpret our estimates
- Result: Subnational governments, relative to the national ones:
 - Impose an extra variable cost of 11% no non-local establishments
 - Impose anextra entry cost of 12% no non-local establishments
- How reasonable are these values?
 - · Compare them with actual "buy local" policies in US states
 - \circ Ex: 8% extra cost imposed by South Carolina to all other states \circ Ex: 5% extra cost imposed by Nevada to all other states

(actual law) (distribution across the US) (matrix)

Strategy # 1: Quantify the cost of home bias *Simple counterfactual*

• What if subnational governments behaved as their national counterparts?

Market integration:

 \rightarrow The local expenditure share by subnational governments \downarrow by \approx 21%

Governments' efficiency:

- \rightarrow The price index of subnational governments \downarrow by $\approx 6\%$
- \rightarrow Under government expenditure fixed, i.e., $P^{s}Y^{s}$ unchanged:


$$Y^s \uparrow by \approx 6\%$$
 !!!

Strategy # 2 Context



Notes: This figure shows the French distribution of regions before and after the integration 2016 integration reform. Regions in blue refer to regions that were affected by the integration process. Thin lines in grey represent the regional borders before the reform. Thick lines in black represent the regional borders after the reform.

Strategy # 2 *Regressions: baseline results*



(a) Intensive margin

(b) Extensive margin

Notes: This figure reports the effect of the French regional integration separately for the *intensive margin* (panel A) and the *extensive margin* (panel B). In particular, it shows the evolution of the estimated β 's and γ 's.


Integration in procurement occurs through the extensive margin only

Conclusions

- Governments' HB promising factor in explaining
 - 1. Procurement market integration in the EU
 - 2. Governments' (in) efficiency in producing public goods
 - 3. Spatial distribution of economic activity
- However, many open questions:
 - 1. Efficiency considerations at the local vs. EU level, e.g., spatial misallocation
 - 2. What about the private sector? Probably the best benchmark
 - 3. External validity? Currently working on building a dataset for US states

A naive look at the data


Local shares by sector back



- Examples:
 - "Laboratory, optical and precision equipments (38)"
 - "Software package and information systems (48)"
 - "Food, Beverage, Tobacco and related products (15)"
 - "Education and Training Services (80)"

State-Level Protectionism

Does The State Have An In-State Preference Law?



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State-Level Protectionism

Explicit Preference Laws


• Example home preference law:

NRS 333.3354 - Introduced 2017

- 1. If a business that qualifies as a Nevada-based business submits a:
 - a) Bid to furnish commodities that was solicited pursuant to NRS 333.300, the bid shall be deemed to be 5 percent lower than the bid actually submitted;
 - b) Proposal to contract for services, the score assigned to the proposal pursuant to NRS 333.335 shall be deemed to be 5 percent higher than the score actually awarded.
- Laws covering limited sectors follow a similar design but specify a specific good (e.g. coal) or a sector (e.g. forestry products)



Look at actual policies in US States' Procurement



Understanding the Local Bias in Procurement

Procurement Data

Our sample (all EU countries potentially)

- Current sample: France and Spain
 - Sellers: 190,000 plants (firm*location): name, location (region)
 - Buyers: 10,000 government agencies: name, location (region)
 - Contract information: Good/service (CPV code), value, date
 - Time period: 2009-2019
- Data work: Classify "buyers" into different gov. levels
 - Local (18.6%), Provincial (16.1%), Regional (23.6%), National (41.7%)
- Aggregation: 2 government levels:
 - Subnational governments (87% of total expenditure)
 - National governments (13% of total expenditure)
 - Similar sectorial composition (goods \approx 17%, services \approx 53%, construction \approx 30%)