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The Single Market and Accountability: Awareness, Assessment, and Attribution of European Internal-Market Governance in Comparative Perspective.

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Single Market Economics Papers

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The Single Market and Accountability: Awareness, Assessment, and Attribution of European Internal-Market Governance in Comparative Perspective

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How much is the European Single Market accountable to its citizens? A mountain of commentary and scholarship implies the answer, “not much.” “You cannot fall in love with the Single Market” is an often-repeated quote from its most famous architect, Jacques Delors.¹ He meant to underscore the technical, low-salience nature of the regulatory project to ensure the “four freedoms” of goods, services, persons and capital across Europe. Influential accounts of its development portray a “regulatory state” (Majone 1996) that undertook “integration by stealth” (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs 2016) behind a “veil of law” (Burley & Mattli 1993), partly thanks to public inattention amid a “permissive consensus” of diffuse Europeanism (Hooghe & Marks 2009). Some experts defend the result as acceptably democratic—noting that technical regulation is rarely subject to broad accountability even in the healthiest democracies (Moravcsik 2002)—but many more see the Single Market as the heart of an EU “democratic deficit.” They worry about the combination of little-understood regulatory responsibilities with a culturally fragmented “demos,” an unelected executive, and “constitutionalization” of EU law in treaties that are very difficult to amend (among many, Weiler 1998; Føllesdal & Hix 2002; Hix 2013).

These concerns seem highly plausible, but empirical evaluation of accountability in the Single Market confronts many challenges. Two motivate this paper. First, any such evaluation starts by documenting the citizen attitudes to which Single Market governance might or might not be accountable, but that data is scarce. Regular public surveys like Eurobarometer pose few questions about the Single Market or its core issues of market openness.² Second, given reasons

¹ Speech to the European Parliament, 17 January 1989.

² The next iteration of this paper will discuss Eurobarometer questionnaires to substantiate this claim, to which there are small exceptions in the standard EB survey and one special EB survey with a 20-question section relating to the Single Market from February-March 2011.

to expect that even in the most democratic arena, citizens will be less aware and engaged with technical-regulatory issues, what baseline helps us judge an acceptable level of accountability in a complex, continent-wide single market?

This paper addresses these challenges to investigate the citizen-level elements of accountability in the European Single Market. We begin by borrowing a conceptualization of the “bottom-up” side of accountability from U.S.-focused work by Amy Lerman and Samuel Trachtman (Lerman & Trachtman 2020). The accountability of a policy regime like the Single Market, they theorize, requires that citizens display awareness (knowing something about the regime), assessment (holding views on whether or not they support its goals), and attribution (crediting or blaming someone for it). To solve the data problem, we fielded an original survey on single market issues with IPSOS in May-June 2023. It includes 2,000-person representative samples in 8 EU member-states (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Romania, Austria, Ireland).³ To address the problem of baseline expectations, the survey includes another especially novel component. Given the difficulty of constructing a normative theory that could posit absolute expectations about the accountability we could reasonably hope to see in the European Single Market, we instead sought to establish a relative reference point through comparison to the other large, advanced-economy single market—the United States. The IPSOS survey was fielded simultaneously with a representative sample of 4,000 Americans, posing questions about interstate openness and federal and state governance that are as similar as possible to those posed to Europeans about these issues in the EU. This allows us to ask: how does the European Single Market fare on citizen-level accountability relative to a large single market that is built into a more “normal” democracy?

Those more “normal” democratic features of American governance—competitive electoral politics for central government, shared language and identity and media, strong central resources—suggest the hypothesis that we should generally see higher levels of democratic accountability in the U.S. than in the EU. Proponents of the European Single Market might thus hope that, at best, its accountability is not dramatically worse than what we find across the Pond. In fact the results are more interesting: they disconfirm this hypothesis across the board. Relative to Americans, when controlling for a host of other conditions, Europeans are significantly *more*

³ The survey also included another 6,000 respondents in Switzerland, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Other papers will consider comparisons to the non-EU members.

aware of their internal-market governance, assess it *more* positively, and *more* clearly attribute credit for it to the EU. This is especially true for respondents in economic positions related to cross-border business, but also holds for subgroups we might expect to be skeptical of market openness and EU or federal authority.

How can we interpret this striking result? This paper only does so speculatively, but we suggest two arguments. One is an institutionalist explanation. For seventy years, the European institutions have empowered their agents to draw attention to issues of interstate openness. They appear to have been successful, encouraging not just elites but the public to see these issues as problems and EU action as their solution. The reverse applies on the U.S. side: though significant interstate regulatory barriers do exist between U.S. states, Americans do not perceive them as problems because no federal actor is tasked with addressing them. The other explanation is ideational, reflecting Americans' extraordinary distrust of their federal government and continental Europeans' greater acceptance of high-level government authority.

The paper opens by addressing potential skepticism about an EU-U.S. comparison, and justifying our main hypothesis about it. Then we explain our modeling of citizen-level accountability, discuss the survey instruments, present results, and develop interpretations.

Justifying the EU-U.S. comparison and a first hypothesis

The survey discussed here is innovative both in generating new data about public attitudes in the European Single Market and in comparing it to responses from the United States, but the latter move is more novel and calls for more explicit justification. Considering EU-U.S. contrasts also leads to our main hypothesis about where we should see more accountability.

An ever-growing scholarly literature argues that today's European Union, while strictly a treaty-based international organization, has accumulated such substantial powers that it is best compared to federal governments (e.g., Kelemen 2004; Menon & Schain 2006; Fabbrini 2010; Genschel & Jachtenfuchs 2014; Kelemen & McNamara 2021). As the only advanced-economy federation that comes anywhere close to the EU in size, the United States is generally seen as the most plausible comparator. The comparison is especially plausible on internal market terrain. Both polities were founded around central mandates to ensure market openness. All historical accounts agree that the leading rationale for creating the U.S. federation in 1787 was to restrict

internal protectionism—generating the constitutional “Commerce Clause” that awards it authority over interstate commerce—and that Europeans were broadly inspired by the vast U.S. market in negotiating the openness-centered treaties that founded the EU.

Today, not only do many legal scholars and social scientists see U.S.-federal and EU market authority as comparable, but they increasingly recognize that EU authority in the Single Market has come to exceed that of the U.S. federal government in many ways. As Cambridge law professor Catherine Barnard summarized fifteen years ago, U.S. internal-market law displays “a greater degree of deference to state actors and to state regulation” than EU law (Barnard 2009, 578). Our own recent work builds on this observation. It shows that EU internal-market authority is stronger than analogous American arrangements in a broad sense, with stricter legal principles for interstate openness that are more systematically legislated and more actively enforced (Matthijs, Parsons & Toenshoff 2019; Matthijs & Parsons 2022; Parsons & Smith 2022).⁴ To give a salient example, in May 2023 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld distinctive California rules for pork production. California produces almost no pork, and was thus effectively regulating Iowan pork farms, who were excluded from California markets and brought the suit. Under EU law, which allows only proportionally-justified exceptions to principles of “unhindered” cross-border market access, a member-state with tough animal-welfare laws (like Austria) may only apply them to its own producers—lacking the authority to exclude other countries’ products that meet overall EU standards. Other examples include professional qualifications (where U.S. states, unlike EU members, enjoy wide powers to require duplicative licensing: Sanderson 2014), public procurement (where U.S. states, unlike EU members, have legally unlimited powers to prefer their own residents for contracts: Hoffmann 2011), or even taxation (where U.S. states are freer to do as they please than EU members: Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2011).

Given that the EU exercises comparable or even greater internal-market authority than the U.S. federation, it seems appropriate to hold the two systems to similar standards of accountability on this terrain. This move also seems analytically interesting because these comparable single-market regimes exist in contexts that vary on many conditions that plausibly affect accountability. In a multi-level arena, we could expect the ability of citizens to exercise accountability over central policy-making institutions to be favored by:

⁴ For broadly parallel points on the terrain of competition policy, see Philippon 2019.

- Salient electoral competition for central-institutional positions that mobilizes citizens to pay attention to central policies
- Central fiscal resources that matter for citizens and encourage them to orient politically toward central institutions
- Shared identity that encourages citizens to see themselves as a group to whom policy-making institutions could be accountable
- Shared language, culture and media that allow citizens to communicate easily with each other and actors in central institutions
- Economic integration in greater flows of exchange and mobility across internal borders, which raises the costs and salience of interstate impediments

All these conditions prevail substantially more in the United States than in the EU. The contrast on the first four points is obvious. On the last, while we know of no recent and rigorous estimates of interstate flows across these contexts, several fairly-recent sources suggest that U.S. interstate trade is three to four times denser than intra-EU trade, and U.S. interstate mobility is ten to twenty times higher (Pacchioli 2012; Aussiloux et al. 2017; Bonin et al 2008; European Commission 2020; see also Head & Mayer 2021). Overall, a combination of economic, social and institutional conditions suggests a clear hypothesis: to the extent that accountability exists in complex, continental single markets, we should find more of it in the U.S. than the EU.

Conceptualizing citizen-level accountability and variation within EU and U.S. populations

Accountability in democratic governance depends on a long chain of relationships that links citizens' concerns to policy outcomes. It could fail in "top-down" ways, because policy-making processes and institutions are insufficiently open to input; in "bottom-up" ways, because citizens are ignorant, apathetic, or fractured into non-communicating groups; or in its middle links, if political parties somehow fail to play adequate roles as intermediaries. All three problems attract attention in debates about an EU "democratic deficit." Experts' most common focus is on top-down problems of institutional closure, emphasizing that the EU has no elected executive and only holds low-salience, low-turnout elections to its Parliament (e.g., Hix 2013). Parties raise concern as well, since the tendency for elite-level pro- and anti-EU attitudes to crosscut right-left

lines can lead them to stifle EU-related debates to manage internal dissent (e.g., Parsons & Weber 2010). Citizens garner their share of the blame, both for low knowledge of the EU (e.g., deVries et al 2011; Pannico 2017) and for fragmentation into national “demoi” that impede genuine intra-European debate and deliberation (e.g., Weiler 1998; Nicolaïdis 2012). These problems presumably reinforce each other. Closed institutions or EU-avoidant parties could deter even otherwise-engaged citizens from tuning in to EU issues.

Bleak though the prospects for EU accountability seemed at the outset of this project, particularly on Single-Market terrain of mostly technical regulation, we wanted to see whether more targeted survey data and comparative transatlantic perspective could at least better specify problems in the foundational citizen-level links of this chain. To organize these links into measurable concepts, we looked to recent work by Amy Lerman and Samuel Trachtman on citizen-level elements of accountability in health policies in the U.S. (Lerman & Trachtman 2020). They build on literature about accountability in multi-level systems, which confront citizens with especially sharp challenges of cognitive complexity (Arceneaux 2006; Cutler 2004, 2008; de Vries et al. 2011; Johns 2011, León 2011; Wilson & Hobolt 2015). Their “three A’s” framework disaggregates a normatively-desirable process of accountability into cumulative steps of awareness, assessment, and attribution. Working backward down this chain, citizens can only hold policy-makers accountable if they can attribute responsibility to certain institutions or actors for certain policies. They can only meaningfully attribute responsibility if they can assess whether they think the policies are good or bad. They can only meaningfully assess if they are aware of the policies.

We could expect that in comparison to the United States, residents of the European Single Market will be less likely to hold attitudes consistent with all three phases of the cognitive process of democratic responsiveness—awareness, assessment, and attribution. Since that hypothesis is motivated by economic, social and institutional characteristics of the U.S. and the EU overall, we also need to consider several key subgroups of these populations to mitigate against finding positive relationships driven by the demographic composition of each market. Three stand out:

- Given higher interstate flows of trade and mobility in the U.S., we should expect it to have more respondents engaged directly in interstate trade. A large literature on

economic voting (e.g., Baccini and Weymouth 2021) and “utility theory” in support for the EU (Gabel & Palmer 1995, Gabel 1998) posits that they will have distinctive views about single markets. Likewise, a dominant finding in work on policy feedback has confirmed that an individual’s direct, personal experience with a specific policy (Esping Andersen 1990; Pierson 1993; Campbell 2003) and even an indirect “proximity” to a public issue can make them more likely to hold discernable, fact-informed opinions about government (see Larsen 2019 for a review).

- Another economic-based expectation, but on sociotropic rather than individual bases, is that respondents from the “periphery”—in poorer territorial units within their larger arena—will be more skeptical about market openness. Our American respondents are spread fairly evenly across its states, thanks to regional quotas, but most of our European respondents (10,000) are drawn from member-states with GDP per capita well over the EU average (Austria, Germany, France, Italy, Spain), with only 4,000 from two countries well below the average (Poland, Romania).
- Anyone familiar with American politics will also wonder if our U.S. sample contains substantially more people with strong anti-regulatory beliefs than we find in European countries. Evidence suggests that, comparatively, distrust is growing at a faster rate in the U.S. than in the EU (Van De Walle and Six 2020; Stokes 2018), as seen most recently in different citizen responses to central government initiatives during the COVID-19 pandemic (Jennings et al. 2021; Altiparmakis et al. 2021). Much of that distrust focuses on regulatory activity and growth of the American “administrative state” since the 1960s (Jacobs and Milkis 2022; Rogowski 2020; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).

As such, across the three A’s of political accountability, current theoretical accounts of citizen responsiveness suggest that the EU should suffer from a democratic deficit. Its citizens should be less aware and more negative in their assessments of the EU’s goals. Note all that we view each of these aspects of accountability as essential to one another. That is, if citizens hold positive assessments, but are generally unaware, there is little reason to believe that their assessments are grounded in actual actions taken by government officials. Moreover, these general patterns in

democratic responsiveness should also hold—and possibly be more pronounced—among subgroups that are predisposed to think more critically about single market issues, namely: those who are skeptical of government regulation, in general; those who are engaged in the single market through trade and business in other states (U.S.) or countries (EU), and those residing in comparatively poorer regions of the U.S. or EU. We stipulate the following three hypotheses:

Awareness Hypothesis (H1): Residents of EU member states are less aware of the EU's Single Market than U.S. residents are of similar internal market functions and consequences. Awareness is both objective – whether individuals know the rules governing the single market – and subjective – whether individuals perceive single market issues as problematic. Similarly:

- H1A: Rates of objective and subjective awareness will be lower in the EU among regulatory-skeptics;
- H1B: Rates of objective and subjective awareness will be lower in the EU among those engaged in the single-market economy;
- H1C: Rates of objective and subjective awareness will be lower in the EU among those living in relatively poorer areas of the market (state or country-level).

Assessment Hypothesis (H2): Residents of EU member states will be less likely to support Single Market goals than U.S. residents. Specifically, all things equal, EU residents will be less likely to believe that businesses should be allowed to do business freely across borders within the EU, and to believe that people must be free to move and work across borders within the E.U., than U.S. residents believe about state borders.

- H2A: Assessments of single market goals will be lower in the EU among regulatory-skeptics;
- H2B: Assessments of single market goals will be lower in the EU among those engaged in the single-market economy;
- H2C: Assessments of single market goals will be lower in the EU among those living in relatively poorer areas of the market (state or country-level).


Attribution Hypothesis (H3): Residents of EU member states will be less likely to attribute greater governing authority to the EU to make trade between countries easier than U.S. residents will be to attribute greater authority to the federal government to make trade between states easier.

- H3A: Attribution of governing authority will be lower in the EU among regulatory-skeptics;
- H3B: Attribution of governing authority will be lower in the EU among those engaged in the single-market economy;
- H3C: Attribution of governing authority will be lower in the EU among those living in relatively poorer areas of the market (state or country-level).

In the analysis that follows, we seek to estimate the relationship between residing in the EU and U.S. markets and measures of awareness, assessment, and accountability on Single Market issues, while controlling for each of these compositional factors (and a variety of other controls noted below). We operationalize engagement in interstate trade and anti-regulatory beliefs with data from our survey that asks directly about these items.⁵ We operationalize the “periphery” as living in a state/country that is below each market’s average GDP per-capita. Figure 1 shows the distribution of these subgroups across our two arenas, notably confirming that the U.S. sample includes substantially more respondents employed in businesses that operate across internal borders.

Figure 1: Distribution of Subgroups in European Single Market and U.S. Market

⁵ The former group includes individuals who reported working (or being retired from) a private-sector job with a firm that sells across state/country borders. The latter includes individuals who registered any level of agreement with the statement, “Regulations tend to do more harm than good.”



Data and Methods

To collect individual-level data on awareness, assessment, and attribution of Single Market activities in the EU and U.S., we fielded an original survey across 8 EU countries and the U.S. in May-June 2023.⁶ We contracted with IPSOS to identify 39,572 respondents over the age of 18 across these countries, and established quotas on age and sex (non-interlocked), of which 18,000 adults completed the survey (conversion rate of 45.5%). Within the U.S., we also established quotas to achieve a geographic distribution across the four census-designated regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). Security screening and data quality features maintained by IPSOS excluded 4% of contacted respondents; in addition, we included two attention checks with the instrument, failure of which led to the deletion of the respondent and the resetting of quotas (5% of contacted respondents). On average, the survey took 15.4 minutes to complete among

⁶ Again, the survey was also fielded three non-EU countries (the UK, Norway and Switzerland), but they stand outside this paper's comparison.

European respondents, and 18.7 minutes among U.S. respondents. The survey instrument was developed in English, translated by native speakers of the target country from our own team, and then additionally verified by IPSOS translators.

Our research team gave extraordinary care and attention to comparability of question wording and conceptualization across and within different market contexts. Given that our focus on multi-governmental decision-making adds considerable complexity to the study of attitudes in those contexts, we made sure that all questions and statements used actual names of governments, countries, and states when applicable. Additionally, since cross-border trade within the U.S. is often understood to mean international trade (outside the US), but since our concern is with intra-market openness and regulation, we were very explicit in question wording and prompts embedded throughout the survey to draw respondent attention to this aspect of interstate trade in the U.S. market. A full list of questions is available in the appendix.

We reweighted respondents to achieve balanced country-level estimates for interlocked age-sex distributions, as provided by Eurostat and U.S. censuses. Composite weights within markets account for the relative distribution of the country's population to the sampled countries' totals within the European Single Market and U.S. Our EU sample stretches across original members and later ones, north-south and east-west divides, and economic "core" and "periphery," since it is well known that views of the EU vary substantially by country. The composite weights, accounting for the probability of being selected within each country and within each market, were applied at the first level of the hierarchical models described below.

Our principal goal is to distinguish variation in democratic accountability that is attributable to individual, state/country, and market-level factors. Our main variable of interest for this broad comparison of institutional accountability is at the market level—a group of countries/states within a top-level framework for market governance—and our attitudinal data is comprised of individuals nested within those countries and states. As such, we use a hierarchical modeling approach, and cluster standard errors at the market level, effectively attempting to estimate a "treatment" effect of residing within the EU or U.S. This approach is particularly suited to understanding the independent relationship of market-level variables while controlling for individual and state-level factors. Such an approach allows us to model the independent relationship of the EU and U.S. on core individual attitudes, accounting for the fact that two markets are comprised of different populations, whose distribution may lead to aggregate

differences in the likelihood of holding attitudes supportive of democratically responsive processes (awareness, assessment, and attribution),

Hierarchical modeling approaches suppress composition effects between markets, and we also include a number of controls that are theoretically correlated with marketplace performance and attitudes. Partisan identification is a likely confounder, but assessing partisan views on regulation in this comparative context presents a unique measurement challenge because there are no American “Euroskeptics” and conservatives in the EU hold variable views on the question of European integration. As such, we first account for the strength of partisanship, acknowledging that partisans behave differently than independents in terms of their democratic responsiveness (e.g., ignoring information or adjusting responsibility attributions: Tilley and Hobolt 2011), or change their perceptions of the information itself than their evaluation of the person or party responsible (Wilcox and Wlezien 1993; Wlezien, Franklin, and Twiggs 1997; Evans and Andersen 2006).⁷ Since party support on European integration largely follows from “new politics” dimensions, we also average our estimates of market-effects over individuals’ self-identified support for two socio-cultural (“GAL-TAN”⁸) related questions, equally applicable to the U.S. context: whether respondents agreed that the government should “do more to solve the crisis of climate change, even if it may initially hurt jobs,” and whether they agreed with the idea that their country’s “culture benefits if more people immigrate here.” These estimates may therefore be biased toward the GAL-side, which favors greater market integration (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002), including among Eastern European respondents (Marks et al. 2006). We also include, education, age, and household income, measured continuously and pegged to country’s income distribution.

We also include country-level (EU) and state-level (U.S.) controls that likely mediate the economic context of individual attitudes and engagement within their respective markets. Conceptually, we consider economic output and opportunity as likely determinates of both attitudes and features of Single Market rules, and we operationalize these as the country (EU) or

⁷ Strength of partisanship is derived from two different questions. In the U.S. sample, we rely on traditional measures of partisan strength, where “strong partisans” (4) and “not-so-strong partisans” (3) are distinct from leaners (2) and independents. In the EU, we first identify non-partisans (1), and then ask a follow up for whether partisans feel “not very close” (2), “quite close” (3), or “very close” (4) to their party.

⁸ This axis of conflict over “postmaterialist values” pits Green-Alternative-Libertarian views against Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist ones.

state's (U.S.) GDP, GDP per capita, the annual percent change in GDP between 2021 and 2022, and the country (EU) or state's (U.S.) GINI coefficient.

We estimate relationships among the entire sample, as well as within three distinct subgroups: those who agreed, to some level, with the statement, "Regulations tend to do more harm than good;" individuals who reported some level of current engagement in the Single Market economy by stating that their firm sells across state/country borders or has operations across state/country borders; and individuals residing in states (U.S.) or countries (EU) where the territory's GDP per capita is below the market average.


Results

Now we present results from the survey that help evaluate and compare citizens' awareness, assessment, and attribution of internal-market regimes in the EU and U.S. Our survey questions were designed to elicit attitudes that are relevant to a wide range of scholarly debates about support and opposition for the EU, market openness, and American federalism, including questions specifically designed to speak to the "AAA" framework. We present the coefficient estimates from the four hierarchical models, and plot the "effect" of EU residency on the dependent variable, compared to residency in the U.S. (i.e., baseline comparison group). A table of point estimates with standard errors and random effects parameters is in the appendix.

Awareness

Like other scholars who take a citizen-focused perspective on democratic accountability, we are agnostic as to whether "awareness" of Single Market issues stems from an objective knowledge of market conditions, such as the movement of people or goods, or whether it is driven primarily by subjective interpretations of market openness. Accordingly, we test the awareness hypothesis in two ways, acknowledging that democratic accountability rests both on widespread knowledge of what market rules entail and on belief that a problem worth solving exists in the first place.

Figure 2: Multilevel Model for Objective Awareness of Single Market Rules



First, we consider what residents know about what the law says about how individuals and businesses must behave within the two respective markets. We consider whether respondents knew the correct answer to whether a state/country could favor businesses within their own state/country for public contracts (yes in the U.S., no in the EU). We then consider whether respondents know if the following statement is correct: “In most cases, when a licensed/qualified professional like an architect or doctor from one state/country wants to practice in [another state/country], federal/EU rules require that they be allowed to practice in [the latter]” (no in the U.S., yes in the EU).


We average correct responses so that a “0” indicates that the individual failed to provide a single correct answer to the two questions (on average 37.3% of the entire sample) to a “2” indicating that they answered both factual questions correctly (15.9% of the sample).

Accounting for individual and state/country-level determinants of objective-awareness, modeled results show a strong and persistent relationship between residency in the EU and

heightened democratic responsiveness. That is, compared to Americans, those living in the EU are significantly more likely – both substantively and statistically – to know the rules governing single market trade. Using the estimated coefficients to derive predicted probabilities, the additive value of EU residency seems large. All things equal, out of every 100 people, relative to U.S. residents, about 8 more EU residents are likely to know at least one single market rule. Placed in the context that the modal response in each market was no knowledge of *any* single market rules, this additive value of EU residency suggests a heightened degree of objective awareness attributable to the EU itself – not to the characteristics of the EU population.

That conclusion is further substantiated by looking at those subgroups most likely to complicate any EU-U.S. comparison. This general relationship holds not only across all Europeans, but also within those who are predisposed to oppose government regulation and those who are engaged in single market commerce. Indeed, compared to Americans who work in firms that sell or operate in other states, Europeans engaged in single market trade are nearly 40 percent more likely to know at least one “objective” single market rule. Remarkably, those engaged in interstate commerce within the U.S. are predicted to have slightly *lower* awareness scores than the general American population.

Figure 3: Multilevel Model for Subjective Awareness of Single Market Rules



If objective awareness of single market rules is comparatively high in the EU, how does subjective awareness of single market “problems” vary? Figure 3 plots the marginal estimates of EU residency, controlling for the same individual and state/country level confounders, on how complicated they believe it is to either get a job or sell goods in another state (U.S.) or country (EU). These two measures are not collinear in either market ($\rho = 0.358$ in EU and $\rho = 0.410$ in U.S.), underscoring that that Americans and Europeans may have different subjective assessments of the difficulty of cross-border interactions in these two domains.

With respect to beliefs about the difficulty of getting a job in another jurisdiction, Americans and Europeans appear to be fairly similar. In raw numbers, Americans were somewhat more likely to strongly or somewhat agree (47.5%) than Europeans (42.2%). When modeled to address composition effects, we are unable to disprove our hypothesis about higher democratic responsiveness in the U.S. at conventional levels of statistical significance ($\alpha=0.05$).


However, it is notable that, among the general population, the coefficient is positive for EU residency, suggesting that, on average, Europeans are more likely to hold that belief after accounting for a variety of individual and state/country covariates. When it comes to subjective awareness of complexity in selling goods, Americans were again more likely to agree overall (55.7%) than Europeans (46.7%), but when modeled to address various confounders, Europeans are statistically and substantively more likely to agree with the idea that it is “complicated.”

These patterns hold for the theorized subgroups. Europeans that are generally more skeptical of regulation see a larger problem. Those engaged in the Single Market find selling goods more problematic. Those in the periphery states (e.g., Poland and Romania) are statistically more likely to see the free movement of goods as encumbered in the EU.

Assessment

The second hypothesis considers how residents of the EU and U.S. assess the goals of market integration. Are they generally favorable to the goals of facilitating business activity and individual mobility across state (U.S.) and country (EU) borders? Having seen that Europeans are generally more likely to be aware of internal-market rules and to perceive internal-market barriers, we now turn our attention to considering how residents assess the general goals of their central authority in enacting those rules and solving those problems.

Figure 4: Multilevel Model for Positive Assessments of Single Market Goals




In raw numbers, Americans agreed with these goals somewhat more than Europeans did, with 80% American agreement and 75.6% agreement in Europe regarding businesses, and 85% American agreement relative to 77.7% agreement in Europe regarding persons. In our view, it is already striking to find that raw European support for these goals is almost as high as that inside the U.S. The finding becomes much more striking when our model strains out composition effects on a variety of conditions. Figure 4 plots the modeled estimates of market residency on the likelihood of agreeing with either of those two goals, independent of one another. The results clearly disprove H2 and its subsidiaries. Statistically and substantively, Europeans are, on average, much more likely than Americans to favor the free movement of goods, services, and people across the EU. The average European is 20 percent more likely than an American to hold the belief that “in order to have a thriving economy, companies must be allowed to do business freely across the E.U/U.S..” The relationship is similar for the belief that “people must be

allowed to move and work freely across the EU/U.S.” Agreement is even higher among our subgroups of interest, often at statistically distinguishable levels. In particular, for those engaged in private firms that sell or operate in a different countries, Europeans are 40-50 percent more likely to hold favorable assessments of Single Market goals than are comparable Americans who work for companies that sell or operate in multiple states.

Attribution

The final stage of democratic responsiveness concerns whether citizens are willing to attribute greater governing authority to solve problems they are aware about (H1) and hold discernible viewpoints on (H2). In the EU we assess attribution through agreement with the statement, “The EU should do more to make trade across Europe easier.” The American corollary is agreement with the statement that “The federal government should do more to make trade across the U.S. states easier.”

Fig. 5: Multilevel Model for Attribution of Authority to Center to “Make Trade Easier”



As with our presentation of citizens' awareness and assessment levels, we disprove our hypothesis about American accountability in this final stage. Here Europeans agree more than Americans even in the raw numbers, with 77% EU agreement relative to 70.9% agreement in the U.S. When modeled, the difference stands out much more sharply. Europeans, on average, are significantly more willing than the average American to attribute greater authority to their highest-level government (the EU) for making cross-border trade easier. Substantively, we estimate that, with all other variables held at their market-averages, Europeans average a 4.4 on a 5.0 Likert scale for agreeing with the statement. Americans average a 3.6 – nearly a full point less. When considered dichotomously, for ease of interpretation, Europeans are almost 20% more likely than Americans to be willing to attribute authority to their highest level of government to make internal trade easier, regardless of partisanship, GAL-TAN dispositions, or country/state of residence. And, as before, the relationship between EU residency holds for the subgroups of interest. Stated differently, relative to similar subgroups of Europeans, Americans who are more skeptical of regulations, actually work cross-border, or live in the poorest states are significantly less likely to want to see their highest level of government take an active role in making trade easier, even after controlling for a host of ideational and context-specific factors.

Discussion

We should begin with caveats: this is a first-pass analysis of a one-time survey. There is more analysis to do, especially further exploring heterogeneity in various subgroup responses. We would ideally want surveys over time to measure the accountability of a policy regime, which is a longer-term phenomenon. That said, consider what could account for our main finding. How can we explain that, on the terrain of internal-market issues, and relative to American citizens, EU citizens seem to *better* fulfill their normatively-desirable roles in a chain of accountability? How could that be, when the most obvious general conditions we expect to support citizen-level engagement with federal-level governance—competitive elections, central resources, united demos—are so much more present in the U.S.?

At first glance, one explanation might start from levels of economic integration across internal borders in these two arenas. We have noted that the U.S. has higher flows of trade across its internal borders, and much higher flows of individual mobility, than does the EU. It may seem

perfectly rational, then, that Americans see fewer substantial problems with internal-market issues, and so display less awareness, assessment, and attribution about them. For Europeans, internal-market trade and mobility are apparently more constrained, so they pay more attention to these problems and support the EU to address them.

This argument has two flaws, however, and actually just deepens the puzzle. The first flaw is logical. General political-economic theory would expect more attention to internal-border issues in the *higher*-flow arena, not the lower-flow one. A higher-flow arena is one where more actors encounter whatever impediments remain at internal borders, giving them rational interests in “completing” a single market to make flows even easier. A lower-flow arena is one where more actors’ economic activities remain framed within subjurisdictions—within member-states in Europe—giving many of them interests in obstructing openness and competition from outside. Indeed, this is the core logic of general political-economic explanations of the rise of the EU. “Liberal intergovernmentalism” theorizes that European interest groups mobilized to build the EU around a strong Single Market, while other world regions did much less along such lines, mainly because Europe had *higher* (not lower) “underlying trade flows” (Moravcsik 1998, 496). By extension, we should see even more mobilization and pressure to eliminate internal barriers inside the United States.⁹

The second flaw is empirical. The notion that Europeans have problems with internal-border issues, while Americans do not, would make sense if the United States had no significant interstate regulatory barriers. Even many well-informed people imagine this to be true, picturing the United States as a free-market nirvana.¹⁰ But as we discussed briefly at the outset, it is highly inaccurate. Firms engaged in American interstate commerce encounter costs from varying requirements for safety, consumer protection, or the environment; duplicative licensing and other administrative processes; massive variation in taxation; and discriminatory procurement and state aid. This is certainly not to say that cross-border trade and mobility is more difficult overall in the U.S. than in the EU, because regulation is not the only challenge in cross-border activity. Europeans in the Single Market encounter not only remaining regulatory barriers and also far

⁹ This logic that internal flows drive federal-level market-building is present in a great deal of other scholarship, like Alberto Alesina’s and Enrico Spolaore’s general modeling of *The Size of Nations* (Alesina and Spolaore 2005), or Samuel Beer’s explanation of the rise of the American federal authority (Beer 1973).

¹⁰ For example, in a special feature on the Single Market in 2019, *The Economist* wrote: “In theory... the EU’s 500m citizens live in a single economic zone much like America, with nothing to impede the free movement of goods, services, people and capital” – but Europe’s market is actually deeply “incomplete” (Economist 2019).

greater institutional and cultural heterogeneity across their member-states. It may be costly for an Idahoan professional to get licensed in Florida, but the Florida job is legible in a way that no Italian job is for an Irish newcomer (let alone for a Finn in Bulgaria). Still, there are enough unmistakable interstate regulatory barriers in the United States that we cannot simply say that Americans have no reason to pay attention to internal-market issues. Indeed, the American combination of high flows *despite* visible internal regulatory barriers are the conditions under which political-economic theory would *most* predict attention and political mobilization around internal-market issues.

A better explanation derives from institutionalist theory, in which the organization of governance feeds back over time on societal actors' prioritization of issues and mobilization around them, and even their perception of problems and interests (e.g., Hall and Soskice 2000; Mettler 2002). In short, the EU institutions have worked hard to attract attention to internal-market issues for 70 years, while American federal institutions have no similarly-tasked agents. Exactly this sort of institutional feedback was a conscious goal of some of the founders of the EU, most notably Jean Monnet, who hoped that the creation of robust European institutions tasked with low-profile but significant economic responsibilities would eventually channel Europeans toward supporting a full-blown federation (Monnet 1978). The first political-science theory proposed to analyze European integration, Ernst Haas's "neofunctionalism," turned Monnet's strategy into a social-scientific hypothesis: if European institutions take on welfare-increasing responsibilities and receive the institutional autonomy to cultivate coalitions supportive of more integration, Europeans will reorient their politics "beyond the nation-state" (Haas 1958, 1964).

While neofunctionalism has been much criticized for exaggerating the automaticity of this dynamic, and underestimating its vulnerability to other developments, considerable research validates it with respect to key elite actors, especially business groups (Coen 1997; Sandholtz & Stone-Sweet 2001) and lawyers (Burley & Mattli 1993; Pavone 2022). Our data suggests that this institutionally-elicited mobilization extends to the public as well, even on the internal-market terrain that Monnet saw as strategically advantageous precisely for its low salience. Our data overlaps with scholarship on business mobilization, since our subgroup of respondents engaged in cross-border economic activity shows especially strong awareness, assessment and attribution relative to an American baseline. But we also display that this apparent mobilization of

Europeans' attention and support is robust even when controlling for attitudes that might motivate skepticism of the EU Single Market project, like opposition to immigration or regulation in general.

These findings make sense in institutionalist terms not only because we have copious evidence of the EU's efforts to cultivate attention and support around the Single Market but because similar institutional roles are so absent from the U.S. arena. No agency in the U.S. has attempted to bring interstate barriers to the public's attention in living memory. The closest analogue to EU activities is the Federal Trade Commission. It focuses almost entirely on anti-competitive practices by private actors, but has occasionally expressed concern about state-level regulations as interstate barriers.¹¹ Still, almost all state-level policy is shielded from FTC scrutiny by the jurisprudential "state action doctrine," which is akin to a broader version of the EU's shielding of "services of general interest" from Single Market principles of cross-border market access. The considerably more obscure Office for Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which performs cost/benefit analyses of all new federal regulation, sometimes acknowledges the cost of fragmented state rules as a benefit of federal ones, but has no power or agenda to reduce fragmented state regulation more generally. Overall, a fundamental institutional feature of American federalism is a fairly strong separation between federal and state activities, such that federal authorities who tried to pursue EU-style restrictions of state-level regulation would confront a series of legal obstacles. This partly explains why, in a mirror image of European business mobilization around its Single Market, American business pays practically no attention to interstate regulatory barriers.¹² Among our respondents, Americans employed in interstate commerce are slightly *less* likely than the average resident to support federal efforts to promote internal openness.

Beyond these indicators of institutional mobilization or demobilization, we also see signs in our data that the EU-U.S. contrast reflects ideational dynamics of political culture or ideology. With apologies for an unconventional presentation of further results to a "Discussion" section,

¹¹ In a brief period of attention in the early 2000s, the FTC produced reports about state rules that discriminate against interstate commerce (notably in online wine sales and markets for contact lenses), and about abuses of the state action doctrine that shield uncompetitive action by private actors (notably professional licensing boards). These reports led to significant Supreme Court cases that restricted state policies in specific areas—online wine sales (*Granholm*, 2005) and licensing boards (*North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners*, 2015)—but did not generate any sustained attention to these issues.


¹² The next iteration of this paper will substantiate this claim, drawing on another part of our project. We have done over 100 interviews with American and EU business firms and associations in several sectors.

consider the following figure. Including all the controls in our previous models, it predicts how likely Europeans are to agree, relative to Americans, with three subjective evaluations of the EU or the U.S. federal government:

- Citizens in the EU/U.S. have a lot of influence over what the EU/federal government does.
- Even when it tries to get things done for citizens, the EU/federal government usually makes things worse.
- The EU/federal government usually has good intentions, trying to do what is best for Europeans/Americans.

Figure 6: Multilevel Model of European and American Trust in Central Authority

(note: unlike previous figures, dot/diamond/square are distinct questions, not subgroups)



This data suggests not only that Europeans trust the EU *far* more than Americans trust their federal government—attributing “good intentions” over 50 percent more frequently—and

displays views about democratic input that are even more striking. Relative to the likelihood that Americans believe citizens “have a lot of influence” over the federal government, Europeans are almost 25 percent more likely to believe that citizens “have a lot of influence” over the EU.

In our view, this relationship is difficult to explain without positing substantial differences in political beliefs—not just institutionally-channeled priming of attention to certain policy problems and solutions. We may have shown that EU citizens better fulfill their accountability roles on internal-market issues than Americans do, but that still does not make it plausible to believe that the EU is more open to citizens’ influence *overall* than the U.S. federal government. In the upper links of the chain of accountability, the EU indeed has the institutional features that worry critics of the “democratic deficit,” while the U.S. has ultra-salient democratic competition for powerful leadership roles within a highly mobilized demos. In other words, our demonstration that European citizens are relatively well informed and positive about the Single Market only challenges some *citizen-level* implications of our original hypothesis, not the plausibility of its larger thrust about greater overall accountability in the U.S. That Americans perceive less influence over Washington, D.C. than Europeans perceive over the undeniably technocratic-leaning institutions of the EU hints to us of remarkably deep-seated antipathy to federal authority in the United States, and remarkable acceptance of quite distant and elitist central authority in Europe. The significance of the ideology-linked controls at the top of Figure 6, unlike in our other figures, also hints of a more belief-based structure on these questions. We plan to explore these questions further in another paper. For this paper’s specific focus on the three “A’s” of accountability in the two single markets, we simply submit that alongside strong evidence for institutionally-driven differences, there is reason to suspect that ideational differences also play a role.

Conclusions

Although seldom discussed as a “Single Market,” the U.S. federal system has institutional, social, and economic advantages over the European Union when it comes to ensuring the accountability of public policy. Nonetheless, in a first-of-its-kind survey targeted directly at internal-market governance in the EU and US, we find systematic evidence that the average European resident is much more likely to hold attitudes and beliefs consistent with the demands

of democratically-accountable governance. EU efforts to inform, persuade and mobilize its population about internal-market issues have been remarkably successful. Americans do not seem to know what to think about this terrain.

Why does this matter? The European Single Market is an economic project, but also a political one. Debates over its democratic legitimacy roughly parallel those in the United States over central government authority. True, the integration of the European market lacks many of the institutional components of American centralizing federalism, but as EU leaders are well aware, this amplifies the need for democratic accountability rather than lessening it. Its market efficiency is dependent upon long-term trends in its political effectiveness—a dynamic that is ultimately rooted in how citizens understand the fairness, transparency, and legitimacy of decisions made for them, regardless of the “objective” good or material prosperity it brings them.

We will note two conclusions for the EU Single Market and the study of accountability in complex federal systems. First, while many critiques of the EU focus on the lack of direct citizen participation, the relationship between direct engagement and citizen responsiveness looks more complex when we study accountability across its necessary steps of awareness, assessments, and attribution. Despite the EU’s modest openness to classic electoral input, it has managed to foster a robust level of awareness and appreciation of its Single Market among its citizens. This partly challenges the prevailing narratives of democratic illegitimacy and of the necessity (or sufficiency) of participatory governance as a bedrock of accountable policymaking.

Second, while almost all scholarship on democratically accountable policy making has focused on the institutional and partisan determinants of citizen responsiveness – a trend exemplified in studies of decentralized and divided governmental systems (Wlezien and Soroka 2011; Hellwig and Samuels 2008) – our cross-market comparison suggests that support and reactions to government policymaking also draw on deeper ideational narratives. Further work must attempt to uncover and parse out the socio-economic, institutional, and ideational dynamics of accountability across political arenas.

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APPENDIX 1 Data tables for Figures 2-6

<i>Awareness (Objective) Knowledge of Rules (0-2)</i>	All Respondents	Regulatory Skeptics	Engaged in Single Market	Residents of "Poor" States/Nations
Strength Partisan Identity (1-4)	0.0207** (0.00964)	0.0417*** (0.00307)	0.0258*** (0.00501)	0.0314*** (0.00841)
Solve Climate Change (1-5)	0.00622 (0.00440)	0.00452*** (0.00106)	0.00503 (0.00610)	0.0242 (0.0222)
Immigrant Benefit Culture (1-5)	0.0147* (0.00761)	0.00368 (0.00836)	0.0225*** (0.00787)	0.00275 (0.00588)
Ideology (1-7)	0.00541 (0.00443)	-0.0101 (0.0108)	- 0.00213** (0.000956)	0.00876*** (0.00234)
Education (1-9)	0.0363* (0.0219)	0.0292*** (0.0109)	0.0254 (0.0159)	0.0301* (0.0165)
Age Categories (1-6)	0.0114 (0.0121)	0.00724 (0.0112)	0.0186*** (0.00458)	0.0176*** (0.00105)
Household Income (1-18)	0.0109*** (0.00337)	0.0106*** (0.000497)	0.0206*** (0.00215)	0.0106*** (0.00405)
State/Nation GDP	3.12e-08** (1.34e-08)	1.96e-08 (1.23e-08)	3.40e- 08** (1.61e-08)	-9.47e-09 (3.24e-08)
State/Nation GDP Increase	-0.00682*** (0.00115)	-0.0112*** (0.00401)	-0.00308 (0.00407)	-0.0129 (0.0118)
State/Nation GDP Per Capita	-1.11e-06 (1.70e-06)	-1.33e-07 (8.15e-07)	2.09e-07 (2.31e-07)	-6.30e-06 (3.93e-06)
State/Nation Percent of Market	-0.00484*** (0.000387)	0.00681*** (0.000218)	-0.0126** (0.00528)	0.0122* (0.00628)
State/Nation Percent of Market	-0.00360*** (0.000668)	-0.00103 (0.00472)	0.0165** (0.00779)	-0.00281 (0.0102)
European Single Market (Base: U.S.)	0.161*** (0.0313)	0.272*** (0.0965)	0.488*** (0.0873)	0.118 (0.247)
Constant	0.455*** (0.0172)	0.0417*** (0.00307)	0.0258*** (0.00501)	0.0314*** (0.00841)

EU Average: Government Contracts (36.57% right); License Reciprocity (49.7% right)
 US Average: Government Contracts (29.93% right); License Reciprocity (33.9% right)

<i>Awareness (Subjective) Complicated to Get Job (1-5)</i>	All Respondents	Regulatory Skeptics	Engaged in Single Market	Residents of "Poor" States/Nations
Strength Partisan Identity (1-4)	0.0343*** (0.00234)	0.0892*** (0.0193)	0.104*** (0.0162)	0.0343*** (0.00234)
Solve Climate Change (1-5)	0.119*** (0.0447)	0.199*** (0.0384)	0.134*** (0.00414)	0.119*** (0.0447)
Immigrant Benefit Culture (1-5)	0.0707*** (0.0140)	0.0838*** (0.00900)	0.0682*** (0.0199)	0.0707*** (0.0140)
Ideology (1-7)	-0.0131*** (0.00430)	-0.0447*** (0.00467)	0.0131 (0.0230)	-0.0131*** (0.00430)
Education (1-9)	-0.0275 (0.0176)	-0.0167 (0.0139)	-0.0333*** (0.0128)	-0.0275 (0.0176)
Age Categories (1-6)	-0.0929** (0.0456)	-0.0884*** (0.0228)	-0.0942*** (0.0325)	-0.0929** (0.0456)
Household Income (1-18)	-0.0116*** (0.00327)	-0.00514 (0.00346)	0.0122*** (0.00356)	-0.0116*** (0.00327)
State/Nation GDP	-3.82e-08 (3.73e-08)	-2.04e-08*** (4.19e-09)	-8.55e-08*** (1.18e-08)	-3.82e-08 (3.73e-08)
State/Nation GDP Increase	-0.0163 (0.0239)	-0.0112* (0.00583)	-0.0128*** (0.000548)	-0.0163 (0.0239)
State/Nation GDP Per Capita	5.49e-06*** (1.47e-06)	1.83e-06 (3.85e-06)	2.55e-06 (3.63e-06)	5.49e-06*** (1.47e-06)
State/Nation Percent of Market	0.0222 (0.0210)	0.0108*** (0.000210)	0.0144*** (0.00530)	0.0222 (0.0210)
State/Nation Percent of Market	-0.00250 (0.0110)	0.0130 (0.0163)	0.0263 (0.0394)	-0.00250 (0.0110)
European Single Market (Base: U.S.)	0.0287 (0.0623)	0.296** (0.145)	0.692 (0.487)	0.0287 (0.0623)
Constant	3.039*** (0.409)	2.068*** (0.444)	1.221 (1.472)	3.039*** (0.409)

EU Average: Complicated to Get Job, 42.17% agree; mean 3.232928

US Average: Complicated to Get Job, 47.49% agree; mean: 3.266193

<i>Awareness (Subjective) Complicated to Sell (1-5)</i>	All Respondents	Regulatory Skeptics	Engaged in Single Market	Residents of "Poor" States/Nations
Strength Partisan Identity (1-4)	0.0618*** (0.00668)	0.0884*** (0.00503)	0.135*** (0.0142)	0.0394*** (0.00504)
Solve Climate Change (1-5)	0.0434*** (0.00519)	0.0919*** (0.0102)	0.0529*** (0.0186)	0.0580** (0.0233)
Immigrant Benefit Culture (1-5)	0.0864*** (0.0118)	0.0997*** (0.00435)	0.102*** (0.0162)	0.0949** (0.0381)
Ideology (1-7)	0.0486*** (0.000677)	0.0212*** (0.00241)	0.0336*** (0.00346)	0.0574*** (0.0166)
Education (1-9)	-0.00182 (0.00614)	0.00882*** (0.00116)	-0.00322 (0.00335)	-0.00198 (0.00806)
Age Categories (1-6)	-0.0543*** (0.0197)	-0.0623*** (0.0182)	-0.0502*** (0.0162)	-0.0394* (0.0203)
Household Income (1-18)	0.00116 (0.00195)	0.00706*** (0.00216)	0.00373 (0.00796)	-0.00165 (0.00344)
State/Nation GDP	-7.27e-08*** (2.86e-09)	-1.12e-07*** (1.77e-08)	-4.80e-08*** (8.62e-09)	-1.62e-07*** (1.95e-08)
State/Nation GDP Increase	-0.00850 (0.0101)	-0.0302** (0.0128)	0.0126** (0.00503)	-0.0343*** (0.00665)
State/Nation GDP Per Capita	-9.29e-08 (1.79e-06)	4.95e-06*** (1.40e-07)	4.09e-07 (1.44e-06)	4.42e-06** (2.14e-06)
State/Nation Percent of Market	0.0184*** (0.000749)	0.0143*** (0.00375)	0.0188*** (0.00244)	0.0431*** (0.00248)
State/Nation Percent of Market	0.0119*** (0.00154)	0.0215 (0.0174)	0.0103 (0.00846)	0.0214*** (0.00588)
European Single Market (Base: U.S.)	0.197*** (0.0135)	0.478* (0.255)	0.235** (0.106)	0.441*** (0.128)
Constant	0.0618*** (0.00668)	0.0884*** (0.00503)	0.135*** (0.0142)	0.0394*** (0.00504)

EU Average: Complicated to Sell, 46.67% agree; mean 3.36432

US Average: Complicated to Sell, 55.67% agree; mean: 3.525022

<i>Assessment Scores Business Freedom (0-1)</i>	All Respondents	Regulatory Skeptics	Engaged in Single Market	Residents of "Poor" States/Nations
Strength Partisan Identity (1-4)	0.0421*** (0.00202)	0.0413*** (0.00444)	0.0749*** (0.0286)	0.0260** (0.0124)
Solve Climate Change (1-5)	0.0319* (0.0182)	0.0220 (0.0142)	0.0270 (0.0315)	0.0591** (0.0250)
Immigrant Benefit Culture (1-5)	0.0835*** (0.0168)	0.0684* (0.0354)	0.103*** (0.00420)	0.0906*** (0.00347)
Ideology (1-7)	0.0546*** (0.000258)	0.0409*** (0.0113)	0.0373*** (0.0132)	0.0632*** (0.000175)
Education (1-9)	-0.00752*** (0.00230)	-0.0142*** (0.00345)	-0.0135*** (0.00493)	-0.00408 (0.00516)
Age Categories (1-6)	0.0528*** (0.000757)	0.0408*** (0.00635)	0.0579*** (0.00810)	0.0558*** (0.0107)
Household Income (1-18)	0.00951 (0.00783)	0.0105 (0.00768)	0.0237*** (0.00147)	0.00768 (0.00490)
State/Nation GDP	-8.03e-08*** (1.75e-08)	-1.29e-07*** (3.10e-08)	-2.61e-08** (1.05e-08)	-1.99e-07*** (1.45e-08)
State/Nation GDP Increase	0.00796 (0.00490)	-0.00350 (0.00920)	0.0112*** (5.01e-05)	0.0181*** (0.00675)
State/Nation GDP Per Capita	-1.04e-06 (1.74e-06)	-1.36e-08 (2.60e-06)	8.29e-07 (2.49e-06)	-4.10e-06*** (1.06e-07)
State/Nation Percent of Market	0.0253*** (0.000655)	0.0360*** (0.00187)	0.00706*** (0.00222)	0.0609*** (0.0103)
State/Nation Percent of Market	0.00846*** (0.00109)	0.00989*** (0.000588)	0.0322*** (0.00358)	0.00242 (0.00487)
European Single Market (Base: U.S.)	0.224*** (0.0557)	0.324*** (0.0923)	0.501*** (0.114)	0.285*** (0.0480)
Constant	2.804*** (0.0118)	3.031*** (0.0735)	1.453*** (0.311)	3.093*** (0.411)

EU Average: 75.56% agree with "Companies must be allowed to do business freely across borders."
US Average: 80.02% agree with "Companies must be allowed to do business freely across borders."

<i>Assessment Scores Movement Freedom (0-1)</i>	All Respondents	Regulatory Skeptics	Engaged in Single Market	Residents of "Poor" States/Nations
Strength Partisan Identity (1-4)	0.0346*** (0.0111)	0.0165*** (0.00478)	0.0309* (0.0174)	0.0126 (0.0212)
Solve Climate Change (1-5)	0.0257 (0.0372)	0.0128 (0.0315)	0.0239 (0.0368)	0.0502 (0.0396)
Immigrant Benefit Culture (1-5)	0.139*** (0.0274)	0.102** (0.0454)	0.158*** (0.0148)	0.138*** (0.0147)
Ideology (1-7)	-0.00800* (0.00445)	0.00767 (0.0288)	0.0181 (0.0127)	-0.0101*** (0.00362)
Education (1-9)	-0.00662 (0.00505)	-0.0158*** (0.000107)	-0.0177 (0.0129)	-0.0104 (0.00781)
Age Categories (1-6)	0.0482*** (0.00153)	0.0209 (0.0159)	0.0543*** (0.0140)	0.0390*** (0.00497)
Household Income (1-18)	0.00652 (0.00712)	0.00937 (0.00769)	0.0122*** (0.00139)	0.00550 (0.00548)
State/Nation GDP	-4.74e-08*** (1.55e-08)	-1.04e-07*** (3.03e-08)	-2.45e-08* (1.26e-08)	-1.95e-07*** (7.87e-10)
State/Nation GDP Increase	0.0136*** (0.00386)	0.0139*** (0.00201)	0.0330*** (0.00631)	0.0140*** (0.000438)
State/Nation GDP Per Capita	-2.45e-06*** (8.91e-07)	-1.48e-06 (2.83e-06)	-4.86e-08 (3.13e-06)	-3.67e-06** (1.65e-06)
State/Nation Percent of Market	0.0161*** (0.00288)	0.0338*** (0.00535)	0.0141*** (0.00310)	0.0469*** (0.00732)
State/Nation Percent of Market	0.0196*** (0.00148)	0.00517 (0.00908)	0.0230** (0.0111)	0.0183** (0.00848)
European Single Market (Base: U.S.)	0.195*** (0.0163)	0.105*** (0.00740)	0.383*** (0.0651)	0.331** (0.131)
Constant	2.600*** (0.212)	3.545*** (0.500)	1.972*** (0.380)	2.820*** (0.785)

EU Average: 77.66% agree with "People must be free to move/work across borders."
US Average: 84.92% agree with "People must be free to move/work across borders."

<i>Attribution of Authority (0-1)</i>	All Respondents	Regulatory Skeptics	Engaged in Single Market	Residents of "Poor" States/Nations
Strength Partisan Identity (1-4)	0.0821*** (0.0196)	0.107*** (0.0298)	0.103*** (0.0382)	0.0903*** (0.0287)
Solve Climate Change (1-5)	0.142*** (0.0265)	0.161*** (0.0359)	0.134*** (0.00581)	0.145*** (0.0129)
Immigrant Benefit Culture (1-5)	0.1000*** (0.0134)	0.0883*** (0.0156)	0.126*** (0.000935)	0.107*** (0.0105)
Ideology (1-7)	-0.00151 (0.00861)	-0.0221*** (0.00438)	0.0113 (0.00842)	-0.00514 (0.0264)
Education (1-9)	-0.0250*** (0.00906)	-0.0169 (0.0169)	-0.0215*** (0.00454)	-0.0218 (0.0132)
Age Categories (1-6)	0.00852*** (0.00307)	-0.00411 (0.00562)	0.0129*** (0.00478)	0.00982*** (0.00254)
Household Income (1-18)	0.00358 (0.00374)	-0.00142 (0.00564)	0.0108*** (0.00296)	0.00217 (0.00231)
State/Nation GDP	-5.66e-08*** (1.25e-08)	-8.71e-08*** (1.95e-08)	-3.03e-08*** (9.59e-09)	-1.49e-07*** (1.54e-08)
State/Nation GDP Increase	0.0164*** (0.00120)	0.00487** (0.00209)	0.0179*** (0.00212)	0.0302*** (0.00799)
State/Nation GDP Per Capita	-8.35e-07 (1.90e-06)	9.48e-07 (3.92e-06)	-1.98e-06 (1.87e-06)	8.93e-07* (5.28e-07)
State/Nation Percent of Market	0.0110*** (0.000240)	0.00969*** (0.00103)	0.00404** (0.00192)	0.0180 (0.0111)
State/Nation Percent of Market	0.0271*** (0.00480)	0.0251 (0.0201)	0.0320*** (0.0101)	0.0229*** (0.00736)
European Single Market (Base: U.S.)	0.604*** (0.0392)	0.679*** (0.246)	0.669*** (0.0961)	0.695*** (0.0812)
Constant	1.649*** (0.124)	1.719** (0.700)	1.258*** (0.275)	1.641*** (0.350)

EU Average: 77.01% agree with EU should do more to make trade across borders easier.

US Average: 70.91% agree with US should do more to make trade across borders easier

APPENDIX 2 Survey questionnaire

SINGLEMARKETS SURVEY FINAL DRAFT IN ENGLISH FOR EU RESPONDENTS

(note: small changes made for specific European countries; please contact authors with any questions about final translated versions)

Thank you for taking our survey. We are conducting an opinion poll on a number of issues affecting European countries. We appreciate your truthful, thoughtful consideration of each question. We want to know what you think, but it is also fine if you have no opinion.

Your answers will be kept completely confidential and you may leave the survey at any time. Only completed surveys are eligible for payment. If you have questions or concerns about this study, contact information for the researchers will appear at the end.

By continuing in this survey, we have your consent to use your responses in future academic research.

1. Could you please let us know what [region of European country] you currently live in?

[drop-down options for each country: region in France and Italy, Land in Germany and Austria, fylke in Norway, województwa in Poland, provincia in Spain, canton in Switzerland, county in Ireland, etc.]

Let's start with some questions about you.

2. How long would it take to drive from your home to a national border?

- Under 30 minutes
- 30 minutes to 1 hour
- 1-2 hours
- Over 2 hours

3. Have you ever lived in another country in the European Union, and if so, for how long?

- I have never lived in another EU country
- less than 3 months
- less than 1 year
- 1-5 years
- more than 5 years

4. Have you ever worked in another country in the European Union, and if so, how long?

- Never
- less than 3 months
- less than 1 year
- 1-5 years
- more than 5 years

5. Were you born in [home country]?

- Yes
- No

6. [for “no” respondents to #5)] Were you born in a country in the European Union?

- Yes
- No

7. What month of the year is it?

- April
- May
- June
- July

TREATMENT 1 ON POLICY ISSUES AND LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT (Respondents see 1 of 2 randomized options for the following 5 prompts, each with one question. The 5 prompts are in randomized order. After those 5 prompts come 2 follow-up prompts about “mutual recognition” each followed by 2 questions).

Below are some policies up for debate. Even if you have not heard of them, read the summary of the debate and let us know what you think.

European prompts – example country: Germany

	Full Decentralization	Full Centralization
Goods: Food Safety	As you probably know, all food sold in Germany has to meet certain safety standards for pesticide content. But there is debate about how tough the standards should be. Some think that the German government should insist on tougher standards. Others say that current standards are safe. They also warn that tougher standards could make	As you probably know, all food grown in Germany has to meet certain safety standards for pesticide content. But there is debate about how tough the standards should be. Some think that the European Union should insist on tougher standards. Others say that current standards are safe. They also warn that tougher standards could make food much

	<p>food much more expensive, and limit the variety of food people can easily buy and sell across Europe.</p> <p>What about you? Would it be good if the German government set tougher food-safety standards for food sold in Germany?</p>	<p>more expensive, and limit the variety of food people can easily buy and sell across Europe.</p> <p>What about you? Would it be good if the European Union set tougher food-safety standards across Europe?</p>
FOLLOW UP	<p><i>You know, there's an alternative way to balance choices about food safety with economic openness across the European single market.</i></p> <p><i>It's called "required mutual recognition," and is sometimes used in the European single market.</i></p> <p><i>Germany could choose its own pesticide standards for food grown in Germany. Other EU countries could choose the standards for their own production.</i></p> <p><i>But the EU would require that food that meets <u>any</u> EU member's standards could be sold across Europe. Food could be sold in German stores even if it met the lower standards of another EU country.</i></p> <p><i>Earlier you said you [agree etc., position taken] with additional German/federal-government requirements for pesticides in food.</i></p> <p>Follow-up 1. This is a complex idea. First, how well do you understand this alternative?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I completely understand it • I mostly understand it • I somewhat understand it • I do not understand it at all <p>Follow-up 2. <i>How much do you like this alternative idea?</i></p>	
Services: License Requirements	<p>As you probably know, nurses need significant training to work in Germany. But there is debate about what that training should require.</p> <p>Some leaders think that in an aging society, the German government should insist that all nurses working in Germany spend 100 hours</p>	<p>As you probably know, nurses need significant training to work in Germany. But there is debate about what that training should require.</p> <p>Some leaders think that in an aging society, the European Union should require that all nurses spend 100 hours training with care for elderly</p>

	<p>training with care for elderly patients.</p> <p>Others think this is too strict. It might limit the supply of nurses who work in Germany, right at a time when nurses are needed.</p> <p>What about you? Would it be good if the German government set stronger elder-care standards for doctors in Germany?</p>	<p>patients, raising all of Europe to this new standard.</p> <p>Others think this is too strict. It might limit the supply of nurses across Europe, right at a time when nurses are needed.</p> <p>What about you? Would it be good if the European Union set stronger elder-care standards across Europe?</p>
<p>Workers: Construction Workers Sickness Leave</p>	<p>As you probably know, many employers are required to provide sickness leave for workers, like laborers in construction. But there is debate about whether all fulltime workers should get sickness leave, and how generous it should be.</p> <p>Some leaders think that the German government should insist on generous sickness leave for all fulltime workers, even if this is more generous than in other European countries.</p> <p>Others think this would be too costly for businesses, and might keep other European businesses from operating in Germany. They think it would limit the creation of jobs in sectors like construction.</p> <p>What about you? Would it be good if the German government required generous sickness leave for anyone working in Germany, including workers from other European countries?</p>	<p>As you probably know, many employers are required to provide sickness leave for workers, like laborers in construction. But there is debate about whether all fulltime workers should get sickness leave, and how generous it should be.</p> <p>Some leaders that the European Union should require generous sickness leave for all fulltime workers, raising all of Europe to this tougher standard.</p> <p>Others think this would be too costly for businesses, and would limit the creation of jobs in sectors like construction.</p> <p>What about you? Would it be good if the European Union required generous sickness leave for all workers across Europe?</p>
<p>FOLLOW UP</p>	<p><i>You know, there's an alternative way to balance choices about sickness leave with economic openness across the European single market.</i></p>	

	<p><i>It's called "required mutual recognition," and is sometimes used in the European single market.</i></p> <p><i>Germany could choose its own sickness-leave rules for businesses headquartered in Germany. Other EU countries choose the rules for their own businesses.</i></p> <p><i>But the EU would require that employers just follow the sickness-leave rules in the EU country where they are headquartered. Businesses could operate across Europe under one set of rules. Some workers could be employed in Germany under other countries' looser sickness-leave rules.</i></p> <p><i>You said you [agree etc., position taken] with additional German/EU requirements for generous sickness leave for all.</i></p> <p>Follow-up 1. This is a complex idea. First, how well do you understand this alternative?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I completely understand it • I mostly understand it • I somewhat understand it • I do not understand it at all <p>Follow-up 2. <i>How much do you like this alternative idea?</i></p>	
<p>Capital: Banks</p>	<p>Many people choose to save for retirement in investment accounts. Governments set consumer-protection rules for the banks that run those accounts, but there is debate about how tough those rules should be.</p> <p>Some leaders think that the German government should insist on more transparency in how banks run retirement accounts, even if this is costly for banks.</p> <p>Others think this might keep banks from other European countries from operating in Germany. It could limit the variety of banking services people can easily buy and sell across Europe.</p>	<p>Many people choose to save for retirement in investment accounts. Governments set consumer-protection rules for the banks that run those accounts, but there is debate about how tough those rules should be.</p> <p>Some leaders think that the European Union should require more transparency in how banks run retirement accounts, even if this is costly for banks.</p> <p>Others think this could limit the variety of banking services people can easily buy and sell across Europe.</p> <p>What about you? Would it be good if the European Union set tougher</p>

	<p>What about you? Would it be good if the German government set tougher consumer-protection rules for banks?</p>	<p>consumer-protection rules for banks across Europe?</p>
Procurement:	<p>When governments spend money on things like roads and bridges, everybody would like to see public money spent wisely. But there is debate about whether Germany's government should be able to use public contracts to support German businesses.</p> <p>Some think that Germans benefit the most if German agencies award contracts to the most competitive bidder, even if businesses from other European countries win many contracts.</p> <p>Others think that German tax dollars should go to German businesses when it makes good sense.</p> <p>What about you? How much do you agree that the German government should ensure that all companies have equal chances for public contracts, no matter what European country they are from?</p>	<p>When governments spend money on things like roads and bridges, everybody would like to see public money spent wisely. But there is debate about whether Germany's government should be able to use public contracts to support German businesses.</p> <p>Some think that Germans benefit the most if the European Union ensures that all public agencies award contracts to the most competitive bidder, even if businesses from other European countries win many contracts.</p> <p>Others think that German tax dollars should go to German businesses when it makes good sense.</p> <p>What about you? How much do you agree that the European Union should ensure that all companies have equal chances for public contracts, no matter what European country they are from?</p>

- **We just asked you about several debates. When you thought about these debates, which of these principles seemed *more* important to you?**
 - Government should encourage competition and growth.
 - Government should protect people from harm.

- **When you thought about these debates, which of these principles seemed *more* important to you?**
 - All Europeans need to play by the same rules, regardless of where they live.
 - Regulations need to change country-to-country in order to fit the local context.

PARTISANSHIP

[14] Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties? [we will provide party options for each country—German examples given]

- Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)
- Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
- Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)
- Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (CDU/CSU)
- Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)
- Die Linke
- andere/keine

[15] How close do you feel to this party?

- Very close
- Quite close
- Not at all close

TREATMENT 2 ON PARTISAN CUEING [respondents see 1 of 4 news stories, randomized, each with 4 following questions in specific order]

PROMPT, BEFORE TREATMENT IMAGES:

On the following page is a recent story from the Associated Press/[Country's Newswire]. Please read it carefully.

We will then ask you some follow-up questions about what you read at the bottom of the page.

[GERMANY pro-decentralization] Engineers on the move—or not?

Lukas Müller sees a bright future ahead, though he isn't sure where. Müller, 22, will soon receive his engineering degree and look for work designing large-scale housing projects. He had thought his skills would take him abroad, but at a recent forum in Berlin he learned that engineers often face hurdles before they can work in other European countries. "I've lived in Germany all my life. I like the idea of living in another European country for a few years," he said. "But it's not as easy as I thought."

Müller is not alone. Speaking at the forum, economist Jacob Hansen explained, "In principle Germany is part of one big seamless European single market. In practice, it can be complicated to work in other countries. Foreigners often have to deal with bureaucratic headaches. They may even have to do more training to be allowed to work."

But what, if anything, should be done about it? Some industry representatives on the panel argued that the European Union needs to do more. A recent EU proposal for a single set of

qualifications for engineers, they said, could make cross-border work easier. It would create a level playing field across Europe, and encourage people like Müller to meet the demand for skilled workers throughout the EU.

Other panelists from the industry argued that European countries should be able to decide if engineers or other professionals can work on their territory. They disliked the EU proposal, worrying that single EU rules might not include the right training, or other European countries might fail to enforce them. Less qualified engineers might come work in Germany.

CDU-CSU officials at the forum stood out for siding with the pro-national side of this debate. As Matthias Haugen, a CDU MP, put it,

Solutions to these sorts of problems have to come from people in Germany. The CDU knows that one-sized-fits-all rules made in Brussels don't work well for people here in this country. The more that countries can choose laws that make sense for them, the better off we'll be. Brussels needs to step out of the way.

Q16: What about you? How much would you favor the EU proposal for a single set of qualifications across the EU?

Q17: How much do you agree with the [party] view? Should Germany and other countries be freer to set their own rules?

Q18. In the news story you read, what was Lukas Müller's profession?

- Plumber
- Engineer
- Contractor
- Lawyer

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[GERMANY pro-centralization] Engineers on the move—or not?

Lukas Müller sees a bright future ahead, though he isn't sure where. Müller, 22, will soon receive his engineering degree and look for work designing large-scale housing projects. He had thought his skills would take him abroad, but at a recent forum in Berlin he learned that engineers often face hurdles before they can work in other European countries. "I've lived in

Germany all my life. I like the idea of living in another European country for a few years,” he said. “But it’s not as easy as I thought.”

Müller is not alone. Speaking at the forum, economist Jacob Hansen explained, “In principle Germany is part of one big seamless European single market. In practice, it can be complicated to work in other countries. Foreigners often have to deal with bureaucratic headaches. They may even have to do more training to be allowed to work.”

But what, if anything, should be done about it? Some industry representatives on the panel argued that the European Union needs to do more. A recent EU proposal for a single set of qualifications for engineers, they said, could make cross-border work easier. It would create a level playing field across Europe, and encourage people like Müller to meet the demand for skilled workers throughout the EU.

Other panelists from the industry argued that European countries should be able to decide if engineers or other professionals can work on their territory. They disliked the EU proposal, worrying that single EU rules might not include the right training, or other European countries might fail to enforce them. Less qualified engineers might come work in Germany.

CDU-CSU participants stood out for siding with the pro-EU side of this debate. As Matthias Haugen, a CDU MP, put it,

There has to be one solution, not one for each country. The CDU wants to solve these problems and stop the confusion that comes with different legal requirements across Europe. There is just one, European economy. The more the EU can create a level playing field across countries, the better off we’ll be. Brussels needs to take the lead.

Q16: What about you? How much would you favor the EU proposal for a single set of qualifications across the EU?

Q17: How much do you agree with the [party] view? Should the EU do more to set the same rules across Europe?

Q18. In the news story you read, what was Lukas Müller’s profession?

- Plumber
- Engineer
- Contractor
- Lawyer

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In Hansen's closing remarks, he ended up arguing for the pro-national side of the debate.

The solution has to come from people in Germany. We know that one-sized-fits-all rules made in Brussels don't work well for people here in this country. The more that countries can choose laws that make sense for them, the better off we'll be. Brussels needs to step out of the way.

Q16: What about you? How much would you favor the EU proposal for a single set of qualifications across the EU?

Q17: How much do you agree with Hansen's view? Should Germany and other countries be freer to set their own rules?

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-

20. Please indicate which party or party's candidates you voted for in the most recent national legislative election:

- [Party options from Q14, plus did not vote]

21. In politics people talk of "the left" and "the right." Where would you place your views on this spectrum?

- Strongly on the left
- Leaning left
- In the middle
- Leaning right
- Strongly on the right
- Don't know

22. The European Union's policies overall could be located on the same left/right spectrum. Where would you place the main emphasis of the European Union?

- Strongly on the left
- Leaning left
- In the middle
- Leaning right
- Strongly on the right
- Don't know

23. If a referendum were held today on membership in the EU, how would you vote?

- Leave the EU
 - Stay in the EU
 - Don't know
24. **Overall, does [country] become a better or worse place to live when people from other countries move here?**
- Much better
 - Somewhat better
 - Neutral
 - Somewhat worse
 - Much worse

Almost done. For each of the following, please let us know if you agree or disagree with the statement.

25. **Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good.**

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

26. **To help verify that our survey is working, please select the answer “strongly agree.”**

27. **In order to have a thriving economy, companies must be allowed to do business freely across EU countries.**

28. **In order to have a thriving economy, people must be allowed to move and work freely across EU countries.**

29. **Governments should try to reduce economic inequality.**

30. **[Country]'s culture benefits if more people immigrate here.**

31. **Politicians should do more to solve the crisis of climate change, even if it may initially hurt jobs in [country].**

32. **When I can, I prefer to buy products made in [country], rather than those made in other EU countries.**

33. **It is important to spend at least 30 minutes a day learning about the latest events in politics.**

34. **Citizens in [country] have a lot of influence over what the national government does.**
35. **Citizens in the European Union have a lot of influence over what the EU does.**
36. **Wealthier countries in the EU have an obligation to help poorer EU countries.**
37. **When it comes to making policies, we should trust the wisdom of the people more than policy experts.**
38. **Even when it tries to get things done for citizens, [country's] government usually makes things worse.**
39. **[country's] government usually has good intentions, trying to do what is best for [national citizens, like "les français"].**
40. **Even when it tries to get things done for citizens, the European Union usually makes things worse.**
41. **The European Union usually has good intentions, trying to do what is best for Europeans.**
42. **I generally trust other countries in the European Union to create reasonable policies.**
43. **It is complicated for people from one EU country to get a job in another EU country.**
44. **Businesses that sell food products in one EU country run into complications when they try to sell in other EU countries.**

Now we're interested in how much you know about some existing rules for the European Union economy. Do you believe the following statements are true?

45. **When [country's] government awards public contracts, EU law allows it to favor [name of nationality, like "German"] businesses over businesses from other EU countries.**
 - Yes
 - No
 - Don't know
46. **In most cases, when a qualified professional like an architect or doctor from one EU country wants to practice in [country], EU rules require that they be allowed to practice in [country].**

- Yes
 - No
 - Don't know
-

DEMOGRAPHICS

And finally, just a few questions about yourself.

47. **Being [German] is important to who I am.**

48. **Being from the [region, from Q1] is important to who I am.**

49. **Being European is important to who I am.**

50. **What is your employment status?**

- Full-time employment
- part-time employment
- Self-employed
- out of work and looking for work
- out of work and not looking for work
- homemaker
- student
- military
- retired

51. **(Question posed if first 3 answers Q49): Which of these categories best describes your current job?**

- Private sector
- Non-profit sector
- Government/public employee
- **Q51. (if 1st option Q50, private sector) Which category best describes your current employer?**
 - 0-50 employees
 - 50-150 employees
 - 150+ employees

Q52. Which category best describes your current job?

- Worker supervised by others
- White-collar professional, employed by others

- Middle management (supervisor in either office or on worksite)
- Upper management
- Business owner or partner in professional practice

Q53. What sector best describes your current job?

- Manufacturing
- Retail
- Construction
- Transport
- Entertainment or hospitality
- Health care
- Financial services or real estate
- Professional services
- Support services (IT, HR, maintenance or related)
- Farming or fisheries
- Other

Q54. Please indicate all categories that describe your current job (yes/no):

- We sell to customers in other EU countries
- We want to sell to customers in other EU countries
- We have business operations in other EU countries
- We want to have business operations in other EU countries

○ **Q51. (if 2nd option Q50, non-profit sector): What sector best describes your current job?**

- Education
- Law enforcement/justice
- Health care
- Social services
- Transport
- Utilities or infrastructure
- Support services (IT, HR, maintenance or related)
- Administration
- Other

Q52. Which category best describes your current employer?

- Local non-profit organization
- National non-profit organization
- International non-profit organization

Q53. Which category best describes your current job, or the job from which you retired?

- Worker supervised by others
 - White-collar professional, employed by others
 - Middle management (supervisor of others)
 - Upper management
- **Q51. (if 3rd option Q50, government): What sector best describes your current job?**
- Education
 - Law enforcement/justice
 - Health care
 - Social services
 - Transport
 - Utilities or infrastructure
 - Support services (IT, HR, maintenance or related)
 - Administration
 - Elected office/party politics
 - Other

Q52. Which category best describes your current employer?

- Local or regional government
- National government
- International organization

Q53. Which category best describes your current job?

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- White-collar professional, employed by others
- Middle management (supervisor of others)
- Upper management

50. (Q50 Branch if last answer Q49, retired): [24] Which of these categories best describes the job from which you most recently retired?

- Private sector
 - Non-profit sector
 - Government/public employee
- **Q51. (if 1st option Q50, private sector) Which category best describes the employer from which you most recently retired?**
- 0-50 employees
 - 50-150 employees

- 150+ employees

Q52. Which category best describes the employer from which you most recently retired?

- Worker supervised by others
- White-collar professional, employed by others
- Middle management (supervisor in either office or on worksite)
- Upper management
- Business owner or partner in professional practice

Q53. What sector best describes the job from which you most recently retired?

- Manufacturing
- Retail
- Construction
- Transport
- Entertainment or hospitality
- Health care
- Financial services or real estate
- Professional services
- Support services (IT, HR, maintenance or related)
- Farming or fisheries
- Other

Q54. Please indicate all categories that fit the job from which you most recently retired (yes/no):

- We sell to customers in other EU countries
- We want to sell to customers in other EU countries
- We have business operations in other EU countries
- We want to have business operations in other EU countries

- **Q51. (if 2nd option Q50, non-profit sector): What sector best describes the job from which you most recently retired?**

- Education
- Law enforcement/justice
- Health care
- Social services
- Transport
- Utilities or infrastructure
- Support services (IT, HR, maintenance or related)
- Administration
- Other

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54. Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?

- **Less than 10,000**
- **Increments of 10,000**
- **More than 150,000**
- **Prefer not to say**

55. Please indicate your proficiency in English.

- None
- Beginner
- Elementary
- Intermediate
- Upper intermediate
- Advanced
- Native-level

56. How many languages do you speak competently, including English?

- One
- Two
- Three
- Four or more

57. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- Primary school or less
- Lower secondary education (academic track)
- Lower secondary education (vocational training)
- Upper secondary education (academic high school)
- Post-secondary non-tertiary education (such as vocational training programs and certifications)
- Short higher education (no degree)
- Bachelor's degree
- Master's degree
- Doctoral degree

58. What is your age?

- 18-24
- 25-34
- 35-44
- 45-54
- 55-64
- 65+

59. With which gender identity do you most identify?

- male
- female
- other

60. And finally, over the past year, has your household's annual income...?

- Increased a lot
- Increased somewhat
- Stayed about the same
- Decreased somewhat
- Decreased a lot

Thank you for your responses. To learn more about this study, keep reading. Otherwise, please hit next to receive your payment.

You have just taken part in a survey experiment to better understand attitudes about the EU single market. There were two experiments. First, you read about some policies. You may have read about policies up for debate in your country of $\{e://Field/country\}$. You may have read about some policies up for debate at the European level. This variation will help us understand whether Europeans differentiate between the two when thinking about issues related to inter-state trade and common regulatory standards. Second, you read a news article. This article was not real, although the story is one that is like others you may have read. There were small variations in this story. Some stories had a political figure speak; others did not. Some stories ended with a pro-national argument, while others ended with a pro-European Union argument. This variation will allow us to further study how individuals think about the common regulations across countries and why they think that.

If you have questions about the study, contact:

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If you have any comments about the questions we asked, or EU single market regulations, please let us know. Thank you very much.

GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU

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Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa website (european-union.europa.eu)

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For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1951 in all the official language versions, go to EUR-Lex (eur-lex.europa.eu)

EU open data

The portal data.europa.eu provides access to open datasets from the EU institutions, bodies and agencies. These can be downloaded and reused for free, for both commercial and non-commercial purposes. The portal also provides access to a wealth of datasets from European countries.



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