The Brussels Effect: Are consumer health and safety regulations across the world shaped by the European Union?

Cristina Herghelegiu ¹ Fernando Martin Espejo ²

¹CET, DG GROW, European Commission

²KU Leuven

Prague, 7 December 2022

Introduction	Data	Empirical Strategy & Results	Conclusion	Annex
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Introduct	tion			

- The Single Market (SM) is an important asset of the European Union (EU) enabling integration through the free movement of goods.
- Health & safety regulations have fostered European integration by increasing trade in goods and consumer protection within the SM.
- Although the primary objectives behind regulations have been internal, an important external regulatory influence has manifested over time.
- The capacity of the EU to be a source of global regulations for foreign jurisdictions is known as **the de jure Brussels Effect** (Bradford, 2020).

Empirical Strategy & Result 00000 Conclusion

Examples of the de jure Brussels effect



The Brussels Effect (Herghelegiu & Martin Espejo)



Objective: Go beyond the anecdotal evidence and document the de jure Brussels effect on a larger scale.

What is the paper doing?

- Assessing the probability of third countries to adopt regulations conditional on the EU having in place similar types of regulations.
- **2** Exploring the factors behind the adoption of EU-style regulations.

Main take-aways:

- The adoption of regulations by third countries is positively associated with the prior existence of similar types of regulations in the EU.

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The empirical literature on the determinants of regulations shows that the likelihood of adopting regulations is higher:

- after episodes of tariff liberalization (Beverelli et al., 2014; Orefice, 2017; Herghelegiu, 2018; Niu et al., 2018; Kuenzel and Sharma, 2021);
- following consultations with stakeholders (Belloc, 2015);
- in industries with higher employment levels (Belloc, 2015);
- in countries which are WTO members (Chin and Che Rusli, 2015).

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Data on consumer health & safety regulations

Consumer health & safety regulations are known in the trade literature as:

- Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
- Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs).

Focus on **57 categories of unilateral SPS measures & TBTs** implemented by 83 countries on more than 5205 HS6 products over 2009-2019.

Detailed Classification

Examples of SPS measures	Examples of TBTs
Tolerance limits for residues of or contamination	• Product quality, safety or performance requirements
by certain (non-microbiological) substancesRestricted use of certain substances in foods and feeds and their contact materials	• Origin of materials and parts
 Labelling requirements 	 Processing history
Irradiation	• Distribution and location of products after delivery


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Other data	sources			


The dataset on regulations is matched with other data sources:

- Export data (BACI, CEPII)
- EU Trade agreements (European Commission & WTO)
- Gravity (CEPII)
- Other import measures (TRAINS UNCTAD)
- MFN applied tariffs (TRAINS UNCTAD)


Share of EU-style regulations per country



Share of EU-style regulations per broad regulation type



Share of EU-style regulations per sector



	Empirical Strategy & Results	Annex 000000000000000

Empirics: The de jure Brussels Effect

Linear probability model (LPM) estimation:

 $Pr[Reg_{ikt}^{s} = 1] = \alpha_{0} + \alpha_{1} \operatorname{Reg} \operatorname{EU}_{k,\overline{t,t-5}}^{s} + FE_{ikt} + FE_{s(ch)} + \epsilon_{ikt}^{s}$

	$Pr[Reg_{ikt}^s=1]$
Reg $EU_{k,\overline{t,t-5}}^{s}$	0.015***
	(0.000)
Observations	5,033,347
Adjusted R ²	0.781
Country _i – HS6 _k – Year _t FE	Yes
NTM Chapter FE	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with *** denoting significance at the 1% level.

Robustness

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The de jure Brussels Effect across various dimensions

Proba. to adopt regulations subject to the EU having similar regulations:

Across sectors: 📭

 A for Stone/Cement, Plastics/Rubber Art., (Semi)Precious Stones, Transp. Equip., Agri-food, Base Metals/Art., Chemical/Allied Ind., Textiles, Mech. Appl./ Electr. Equip., Precision/Medical Instr.

Across types of regulations: ••••

Across countries: 📭 💿

• \searrow for countries with a higher GDP/capita.

Empirical Strategy & Results

Conclusion

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Comparison for the EU, the US, and China

	$Pr[Reg_{ikt}^s=1]$
Reg $EU_{k,\overline{t,t-5}}^{s}$	0.010***
	(0.000)
Reg $US_{k,\overline{t,t-5}}^{s}$	0.006***
	(0.000)
$\operatorname{Reg} \operatorname{CN}_{k,\overline{t,t-5}}^{s}$	0.005***
<i>T</i> T · · ·	(0.000)
Observations	4,681,589
Adjusted R ²	0.790
Country _i – HS6 _k – Year _t FE	Yes
NTM Chapter FE	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with *** denoting significance at the 1% level.

Empirics: Factors behind the de jure Brussels effect (1)

The mechanisms through which the de jure Brussels effect unfolds can be:

- market-driven (e.g. influence of foreign firms over their governments)
- treaty-driven (e.g. bilateral and/or multilateral agreements)

LPM estimation:

$$Pr[EUstyleReg_{ikt}^{s} = 1] = \alpha_{1} \Delta ExpShrToEU_{ik,\overline{t,t-5}} + \alpha_{2}FTAwEU_{i,t-5} + Controls + FE_{i} + FE_{k} + FE_{t} + FE_{s(ch)} + \epsilon_{ikt}^{s}$$

 \Rightarrow Controls include: GDP, GDP/capita, Δ Tariffs, other NTMs.

Empirics: Factors behind the de jure Brussels effect (2)

	$Pr[EUstyleReg_{ikt}^s=1]$
Trade agreement with the EU_{t-5}	0.027*** (0.006)
Δ Export share to the $EU_{\overline{t,t-5}}$	0.002*** (0.001)
$\log \text{GDP}_{t-5}$	0.697*** (0.039)
$\log \text{ GDP per capita}_{t=5}$	-0.670*** (0.038)
Δ MFN applied tariff $_{\overline{t,t-5}}$	-0.098*** (0.017)
Nb. of different other $NTMs_{t-5}$	-0.047*** (0.002)
Observations Adjusted R ²	328,198 0.199
Country _i — HS6 _k — Year _t FE NTM Chapter FE	Yes Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with *** denoting significance at the 1% level.

Introduction	Data	Empirical Strategy & Results	Conclusion	Annex
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Conclusior	ı			

- The probability that a country adopts consumer & health regulations increases with the prior existence of similar regulations in the EU.
- The adoption of EU-style regulations is associated with market forces (i.e. increase in the share of the EU in a country's total exports) and treaty-driven forces (i.e. existence of trade agreements with the EU).
- The de jure Brussels effect is an underestimation of the overall Brussels effect.

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Next steps	;			

- Refine the definition of the de jure Brussels effect (e.g. first mover)
- Understand the de jure Brussels effect in specific areas (e.g. environment)
- Perform some falsification tests
- Pick a case study and dig further

THANK YOU!

Annex

Detailed SPS Classification (1)

Prohibitions for SPS reasons Geographical restrictions on eligibility systems approach Authorization requirement for SPS reasons for importing certain products Authorization requirement for importers for SPS reasons bubblictions or subtrictions of importers for SPS reasons
ystems approach Authorization requirement for SPS reasons for importing certain products Authorization requirement for importers for SPS reasons
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Authorization requirement for importers for SPS reasons
Analikitiana ay yestyiatiana af impanto fay SDS yesaana ya a
Prohibitions or restrictions of imports for SPS reasons, n.e.s.
olerance limits for residues of or contamination by certain (non-microbiological) substances
Restricted use of certain substances in foods and feeds and their contact materials
abelling requirements
Aarking requirements
Packaging requirements
Acrobiological criteria of the final product
lygienic practices during production related to SPS conditions
lygienic requirements n.e.s.
Cold or heat treatment
rradiation
umigation
reatments to eliminate plants & animal pests or disease-causing organisms
n the final product n.e.s. or prohibition of treatment
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Source: UNCTAD (2019).

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Detailed SPS Classification (2)

Detailed SPS Code	Description
A61	Plant-growth processes
A62	Animal-raising or -catching processes
A63	Food and feed processing
A64	Storage and transport conditions
A69	Other requirements relating to production or post-production processes n.e.s.
A81	Product registration and approval requirement
A82	Testing requirements
A83	Certification requirements
A84	Inspection requirements
A851	Origin of materials and parts
A852	Processing history
A853	Distribution and location of products after delivery
A859	Traceability requirements n.e.s.
A86	Quarantine requirements
A89	Conformity assessment related to SPS conditions n.e.s.
A9	SPS measures n.e.s.

Source: UNCTAD (2019).




Detailed TBT Classification

Detailed TBT Code	Description
B14	Authorization requirements for importing certain products
B15	Authorization requirements for importers
B19	Import authorization/licensing related to TBTs n.e.s.
B21	Tolerance limits for residues of or contamination by certain substances
B22	Restricted use of certain substances
B31	Labelling requirements
B32	Marking requirements
B33	Packaging requirements
B41	TBTs regulations on production processes
B42	TBTs regulations on transport and storage
B49	Production or post-production requirements n.e.s.
B6	Product identity requirements
B7	Product quality, safety or performance requirements
B81	Product registration/approval requirements
B82	Testing requirements
B83	Certification requirements
B84	Inspection requirements
B851	Origin of materials and parts
B852	Processing history
B853	Distribution and location of products after delivery
B859	Traceability requirements n.e.s.
B89	Conformity assessment related to TBTs n.e.s.
B9	TBTs measures n.e.s.


Source: UNCTAD (2019).

Share of EU-style regulations per broad NTM type



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Share of EU-style regulations per sector



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Robustness: The de jure Brussels Effect

	$Pr[Reg_{ikt}^s=1]$						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	SPS	TBT	Broad NTM	Alt. FE	$\frac{\text{Last year}}{\geq 2014}$	Wo. top 10% dev. ctries	Alt. sq.
= 1 if Regulation $EU_{k,\overline{t,t-5}}^{s}$	0.008*** (0.000)	0.027*** (0.000)	0.038*** (0.000)	0.017*** (0.000)	0.015*** (0.000)	0.012*** (0.000)	0.073*** (0.000)
Δ MFN applied tariff (t,t-5)				-0.144*** (0.004)			
Nb. of other NTMs (t-5)				-0.118*** (0.000)			
GDP (t-5)				-0.257*** (0.003)			
GDP per capita (t-5)				0.326*** (0.003)			
Total import value (t-5)				-0.001*** (0.000)			
Total export value (t-5)				-0.000** (0.000)			
Nb. of RTA partners (t-5)				0.006*** (0.000)			
Observations Adjusted R ²	2668413 0.770	2176702 0.858	2957295 0.762	5377449 0.594	4872890 0.776	4751252 0.779	10439147 0.138

Note: Robust standard errors in parantheses, with *** denoting significance at the 1% level.

The de jure Brussels Effect across sectors

Sector	$\Pr[Reg_{ikt}^s = 1]$	Sector	$\Pr[Reg_{ikt}^s = 1]$
Animal Products	0.019*** (0.001)	Footwears & Gears	0.001 (0.002)
Vegetable Products	0.016*** (0.001)	Stone, Cement	0.037*** (0.004)
Animal/Vegetable Fats & Oils	0.016*** (0.001)	(Semi) Precious Stones	0.031*** (0.007)
Prepared Foodstuffs & Beverages	0.018*** (0.001)	Base Metals & Articles	0.011*** (0.003)
Mineral Products	-0.006* (0.003)	Mech. Appliances/ Electr. Equip.	0.005*** (0.001)
Chemical/Allied Industries	0.005*** (0.001)	Transport Equipment	0.026*** (0.002)
Plastics & Rubber Articles	0.035*** (0.002)	Precision & Medical Instr.	0.003* (0.002)
Raw Hides & Skins	-0.021*** (0.003)	Arms & Ammunition	-0.056*** (0.011)
Woods	0.017*** (0.003)	Miscellaneous	0.001 (0.002)
Pulp Of Wood & Paper	0.004 (0.004)	Works Of Art	-0.096*** (0.023)
Textiles	0.006*** (0.001)		

Note: Robust standard errors in parantheses with *** denoting significance at the 1% level.

The de jure Brussels Effect across regulation types

Regulation Type	$\Pr[Reg^s_{ikt} = 1]$	Regulation Type	$\Pr[Reg_{ikt}^s = 1]$
Prohibitions/restrictions for SPS reasons	0.000 (0.001)	Tolerance limits for resid. & restr. subst. use	0.027*** (0.001)
Tolerance limits for resid. & restr. subst. use	0.037*** (0.001)	Labelling, marking & packaging req.	0.018*** (0.001)
Labelling, marking & packaging req.	0.008*** (0.001)	Prod./post-prod. req.	0.038*** (0.004)
Hygienic req. rel. to SPS conditions	0.068*** (0.001)	Product identity req.	0.081** (0.033)
Other req. rel. to prod./post-prod. processes	-0.039*** (0.002)	Product quality, safety or performance req.	0.020*** (0.001)
Conf. assessm. rel. to SPS conditions	0.016*** (0.001)	Conf. assessm. rel. to TBT	0.012*** (0.001)
Import authorization/licensing rel. to TBT	-0.141*** (0.037)		

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Note: Robust standard errors in parantheses with *** denoting significance at the 1% level.



	$\Pr[Reg_{ikt}^s = 1]$
= 1 if Reg EU ^s _k $\frac{1}{t-5} \times$ GDP per capita (t-5)	-0.013***
,,,, U	(0.000)
= 1 if Reg EU ^s _{k,t,t-5}	0.120***
K,t,t=5	(0.001)
Observations	5033347
Adjusted R ²	0.781
$Country_i - HS6_k - Year_t FE$	Yes
NTM Chapter FE	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with *** denoting significance at the 1% level.

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Robustness: Factors behind the de jure Brussels effect

	$Pr[Reg_{ikt}^s=1]$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
=1 if Trade agreement with the EU_{t-5}	0.043***	0.033***	0.027***	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Δ Export share to the $EU_{\overline{t,t-5}}$	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$\log \text{GDP}_{t-5}$	0.856***	0.654***	0.707***	0.657***
	(0.047)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.041)
$\log \text{ GDP } per \text{ capita}_{t-5}$	-0.936***	-0.634***	-0.680***	-0.671***
	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Δ MFN applied $tariff_{\overline{t,t-5}}$	-0.067***	-0.089***	-0.092***	-0.099***
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Nb. of different other NTM_{t-5}	-0.045***	-0.047***	-0.047***	-0.043***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Nb. of RTA $partners_{t-5}$		-0.004*** (0.001)		
Log Total import value $_{t-5}$		0.005*** (0.000)		
Log Total export value $t{t-5}$		-0.002*** (0.000)		
Observations	233,318	328,198	324,361	305,686
Adjusted R ²	0.310	0.199	0.199	0.198
Country _i – HS6 _k – Year _t FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
NTM Chapter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with *** denoting significance at the 1% level.